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Although the literature on the effects of both aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
on development is vast (eg. Burnside and Dollar, 1997, Dollar and Easterly, 1999, Easterly, 
2003), the relationship between aid and FDI has not been sufficiently explored.   This paper 
empirically investigates the effect of aid on foreign direct investment in view of the 
hypothesis that countries that receive aid also become more likely to receive FDI.  We further 
claim, however, that this happens especially in cases of good governance and financial market 
development, and not necessarily otherwise.   
To test these hypotheses we employ a panel analysis and control for the factors 
besides aid that are likely to encourage or discourage the FDI flows, such as stability 
indicators, openness and the income level.  The preliminary findings appear to provide robust 
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There is renewed interest among policymakers and many donor governments to increase 
their role in official development assistance. Despite the internationally agreed rate of official 
assistance (0.7% of their respective GDP) many of the donor countries remain far below this 
level. Notwithstanding this, aid has been and remains to be a significant portion of the GDP of 
many developing and less developed countries. Given the significant role of aid flows for the 
recipient economies and the renewed interest among donors, the effects of aid flows —  more 
importantly the effectiveness of aid flows — has therefore been at the center of the 
development agenda.  
The effects of aid flows on economic growth, private investment, government revenue and 
quality of institutions, among several other aspects, have been widely discussed in the 
literature.
4 The following study examines a different but related issue: Does official 
development assistance create sufficient positive direct and indirect (signaling) effects in the 
recipient economy to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) to the aid recipient 
economy? While the relationship between FDI and aid has also been alluded to a lot in the 
literature, the literature falls short of offering a satisfactory account of the empirical linkage 
between these variables. 
The question has relevance from several different perspectives. Firstly, the relationship 
between aid flows and foreign direct investment flows underlies the major issue of aid 
effectiveness. The empirical evidence regarding the growth or private investment benefits of 
aid flows has been ambiguous. Several studies have found that official development 
                                                 
4 An overview of several variables’ relationship with aid is provided in White (1992), including the relationship 
between aid and growth, aid and the real exchange rate, and aid and savings. Other papers are discussed in the 
literature review section of this paper. Buliř and Hamann (2001) discuss the effects of aid flows on the fiscal 
discipline of the recipient country, while Lensink (1993) and Pillai (1982) show evidence regarding the negative 
effects of aid flows on government revenue. Stotsky and Wolde Mariam (1997) argue the contrary, showing that 
aid flows increase the revenue effort of the recipient economy. Knack (2001) and Alesina and Weder (2002) 
study the link between the quality of bureaucracy and aid flows, and the possible incentives created for.    3
assistance does not necessarily improve economic conditions in the recipient country, and 
sometimes may even worsen the conditions. 
5 In fact many studies suggest that the 
effectiveness of official assistance depends on the existence of necessary local conditions, 
ranging from “good” macroeconomic policies, deep local financial markets, and  negative 
external shocks, to “good” geography.
6  
Secondly, from a balance of payments accounting perspective, the question can be 
interpreted as whether or not the official financing is eventually replaced by private financing. 
Rephrasing this statement, one could ask whether or not aid recipient countries graduate from 
aid-dependency and are able to finance their BOP from the private markets. The expectation 
is that the aid-recipient countries, with effective use of the official development assistance and 
having mostly implemented first-generation reforms and second-generation reforms, will be 
able to attract significant levels of FDI which will eventually replace aid flows. If private 
capital flows can replace aid flows in financing development then one can argue that the loans 
were successful in creating an enabling environment to the private sector, and the need for 
repetitive official assistance disappears over time.
7 
Thirdly, recently several studies have looked into the effects of aid flows on the 
institutional quality of the recipient economy. Knack (2001), Alesina and Weder (2002), 
among others, have shown that aid flows could create governance issues. This is mostly due 
to the nature of the capital flows, as aid flows generate a lot of rent they  could increase the 
rent seeking activities and dead weight losses. If so, then intermediating the same magnitude 
                                                 
5 Evrensel (2002) studies the effectiveness of IMF lending programs, interpreting the findings of the study as 
suggesting the ineffectiveness of the programs in improving economic conditions in the borrowing economy. 
Burhop (2004) finds that the causal impact of aid on growth and investment differs across countries, without a 
notable connection with good economic policy. 
6 Burnside and Dollar (???) discuss the role of good macroeconomic policies. Nkusu and Sayek (2004) discuss 
the role of local financial market development in allowing better management of official development assistance. 
Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2002) and Guillamont and Chauvet (2001) discuss the role of geography and 
external shocks, respectively. 
7 Easterly, 2005, shows that the structural lending packages are currently very repetitive.    4
of flows through the private sector might be preferred, as the markets might impose 
managerial control more effectively compared to management of official assistance.  
Fourthly, recently the official development assistance loans have increasingly become 
more comprehensive to include private sector related issues, especially focusing on private 
sector enabling reforms. Knack (2001) reports that, according to a World Bank study 
(reference), projects funded by the World Bank increasingly include components of public 
sector reforms in areas such as civil service, legal, and judicial systems, public expenditure 
management, anticorruption, and fiscal transparency. Building administrative capacity has 
become a significant part of loans recently. Supporting evidence is reflected in the lending 
patterns of the World Bank; lending in support of public sector institutional reforms has 
nearly doubled from 1997 to 1999, increasing from US$4 billion to US$ 7.5 billion. 
Furthermore, over the same period, the share of approved projects that include public 
expenditure and financial reform components have increased from 9 % to 28%, and the share 
of those that include anticorruption or fiscal transparency components have increased from 
8% in 1998 to 50% in 2000. Given this emphasis of using the official development assistance 
as a vehicle to create a private sector enabling environment the question of whether or not aid 
flows induce significantly more foreign direct investment inflows becomes a very important 
and relevant question.  
Along these lines, this paper investigates the relationship between FDI and aid. Our 
main hypothesis is that aid leads FDI only in cases of good governance and financial market 
development and not necessarily otherwise.  We argue that the presence of foreign assistance 
in a country is not sufficient condition to attract FDI and hence the lack of a direct 
relationship between the two variables should not be unexpected.  As noted above, this is   5
along the lines of the discussion regarding the necessity of good macroeconomic policies and 
deep financial markets for the effective use of aid flows, in generating economic growth.
8  
Using unbalanced panel data on 197 countries over the period of 1960-2004, we 
investigate the causal effect of Aid on FDI using moving averages of data with the 
consideration that investment decision do not depend on year to year observations, but, rather, 
a stock of information on the economic performance of a country. The findings of the current 
paper provide empirical evidence strongly in support of our hypotheses: both good 
governance and financial market development significantly improves the impact of aid on 
subsequent flows of FDI.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the relevant 
literature. In section III, the data and methodology are discussed, Section IV presents the 
empirical results, and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Given the increased volume of FDI flows over the past decade and the belief of potential 
benefits of FDI on growth and development, understanding the factors that affect the FDI 
flows has gained importance and hence have been studied extensively in the literature.
9  In 
this study we will limit our review of the literature with the macroeconomic studies of the 
determinants of FDI flows, and will not go into the micro-level studies.
10 While there is no 
consensus on a final list of factors that are most important in influencing FDI flows, there is 
consensus regarding the direction of effect for many of the variables studied. Among the 
                                                 
8 See footnote 3.  
9 Many studies have found that FDI could potentially have positive effects on economic growth; however, the 
extent of effect depends on several conditions that could be categorized as “the absorptive capacity” of the local 
economy. The absorptive capacity includes the human capital (see Borenzstein, de Gregario and Lee,1998), the 
trade policy of the local economy (Balasubramanyam et al, 1996), and financial market depth (Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek, 2004), among others.  
10 For a more detailed literature review see Caves (1996) for the earlier studies and Blonigen (2005) for more 
recent studies.    6
variables that have been shown to influence FDI flows is the market size, the openness to 
trade of the recipient economy, the exchange rate, taxes and tariffs, among many other 
variables. Despite the very extensive list of the variables discussed as possible determinants of 
FDI, aid flows is rarely mentioned as a factor that affects FDI. This paper fills this void in the 
literature.  
As discussed in Singh and Jun (1995) the FDI literature deals with three specific 
questions: the reasons national companies become multinationals, the reasons underlying the 
choice of the operation mode in the foreign country (exporting, licensing, versus international 
production), and reasons for FDI flows across countries. These questions could be discussed 
through the eclectic paradigm put forward by Dunning (1993), namely the ownership-
location-internalization (OLI) paradigm. This paradigm is built around four conditions: the 
level of ownership-specific (O) advantages, the level of market internalization (I) advantages, 
the extent of location-specific (L) advantages and the extent of foreign production. The third 
question put forward by Singh and Jun (1995) is the focus of this study, and the location (L) 
pillar of the OLI paradigm is the most appropriate means for this discussion. Among the 
various location (L) factors are the distribution of resource endowments and markets, input 
prices, quality and productivity, transport and communication cost, investment incentives, 
barriers to trade, social and infrastructural provisions, cross-country differences and system of 
government.  
Calvo et al. (1996), in studying the evolution of capital flows to developing countries, 
classifies the factors that influence FDI flows as “push” or “pull” factors. The “push” factors 
are those that are external to the recipients of FDI, while the “pull” factors are those internal 
to them. A similar classification is presented by Tsai (1991), Ning and Reed (1995) and Lall 
et al. (2003), classifying the factors as those on the supply-side and those on the demand-side. 
The current study will focus on the latter group of factors, namely the economic and social   7
variables that capture the demands-side (pull) factors. The pull factors include interest rates, 
tax and tariff levels, market size and potential, quality of institutions, wage rates, human 
capital, cost differentials, exchange rates, fiscal policies, trade policies, physical and cultural 
distance, and state of infrastructure among others.  
Root and Ahmed (1977), Nigh (1986), Ning and Reed (1995), and Love and Lage-
Hidago (2000), among many others, find that MNFs, either in search to exploit scale 
economies or strong markets for the sale of their final products, prefer to invest in economies 
with larger market size and market potential. The market size and potential are measured as 
the GDP, GDP per capita, or GDP growth. Contrary to these numerous studies that find the 
market size or potential to positively influence the location choice of MNFs Bollen and Jones 
(1982) and Filippaios et al. (2003) find that the relationship could well be negative under 
different estimation methods and datasets. 
The exchange rate is shown to be an important factor in influencing the relative wealth 
of MNFs, and through this relative wealth effect an important factor that affects the FDI 
flows. FDI is shown to increase (decrease) with depreciation (appreciation) of host country’s 
currency. Froot and Stein (1992) show that the relative wealth effects of the exchange rate 
changes are due to imperfections in the capital markets, whereas Blonigen (1997) shows that 
this effect is due to imperfections in the goods markets. The predictions of these two models 
are supported by the empirical findings of Grubert and Mutti (1991), Swenson (1994), Kogut 
and Chang (1996), with limited evidence that the effect is larger for merger and acquisition 
FDI (see, e.g., Klein and Rosengren, 1994).  
Trade policies effect FDI flows via quotas, tariffs or other barriers to trade. Host 
country’s degree of openness to trade, measured as either the de jure measures of trade 
policies or de factor measures of the extent of trade as a share of GDP, is a priori thought to 
be a positive determinant of FDI decisions in the literature. Deichman (2001), Janicki and   8
Wunnava (2004), Caetano et al (2004) support this a priori expectation that trade and FDI are 
complements. By contrast, Filippaios et al. (2003) finds out that ratio of exports to external 
trade is a negative determinant of US FDI, which they interpret as suggesting that the MNFs 
invest to serve the local market rather than export its internationally produced goods.  
The education level in the host country reflects not only the investment in the human 
capital and skills but also the availability of professional services that could be demanded by 
the MNFs. In a cross-country study, Lall et al (2003) show the positive relation between the 
human capital and FDI inflows. Deichman et al. (2003) find supporting evidence at the 
regional level, using student per teacher ratio to capture the quality of education.  
Studies have shown that besides the above-mentioned economic dimensions political 
stability and quality of institutions could possibly play an important role in the decisions of 
MNFs. Instability and bad governance are factors that discourage FDI inflows, as such 
instability and low quality of institutions act as taxes and additional costs to investment 
decisions. Lall et al (2003) measure political stability using the political right’s index 
proposed by Gastil (1984-1994) and find supporting evidence. Singh and Jun (1995), using 
the political risk index developed by Business Environment Risk Intelligence, find a positive 
relation between FDI and stability. Smarzynska and Wei (2001) use two measures of 
corruption indices and prove negative effect of corruption on FDI decisions. Janicki and 
Wunnava (2004), and Brada et al (2004) find that healthy investment environments by means 
of macroeconomic and political stability are favored by MNFs. On the contrary, Bollen and 
Jones (1982) reports weak effects of political instability on FDI, measuring political 
instability as including events of political assassinations, coups, armed attacks, and deaths 
from domestic violence. Moreover, Albuquerque et al (2004) find that the relationship 
between the strength of property rights, absence of corruption and quality of governance have 
no significant effect on FDI inflows.   9
Besides political instability, the MNFs are also concerned about macroeconomic 
stability, which can be proxied by the inflation rate in the local economy.  Sayek (2004) 
shows that inflation in the host country leads to “consumption-smoothing” behavior of MNFs, 
who shift their production decision between the home and the host country. 
Recent empirical studies on FDI also suggest that agglomeration effects provide 
valuable information to the new investors. One proxy for such agglomeration effects is the 
lagged FDI inflows, which include the previous investments by MNFs. The persistent 
behavior of FDI is well-documented by Wheeler and Mody (1992), Singh and Jun (1995), and 
Maskusen and Markus (2002), among others.  
The availability of professional and business services in the host country could also be 
thought of as measures of agglomeration effects. Among such business services one can think 
of the depth of financial markets. Though the MNFs would mostly use their retained earnings 
for investment decisions they would still benefit from the development of local financial 
markets in carrying out their daily operations. Albuquerque et al (2004), measuring the 
financial depth as the ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP, find further supporting evidence regarding the positive effects of agglomeration effects 
on FDI.  
Despite this very rich list of variables that have been identified as factors influencing the 
FDI decisions of MNFs, the role of aid flows in this process is discussed in a very limited 
fashion. Only in Root and Ahmed (1977) is per capita foreign aid is mentioned as a potential 
determinant of FDI, with no significant relationship reported. In a micro-data study, Blaise 
(2005) shows that, Japanese official assistance to the People’s Republic of China (RPC) has a 
significant promoting effect on FDI.  
Though the effects of aid on FDI have not been explicitly studied in the literature, there 
is an extensive literature studying the effects of official development assistance (ODA) on   10
economic growth, and much more limited literature studying the relationship between 
domestic investment and ODA.  The studies on the effects of ODA on growth have found that 
the growth effects of aid depend on the local economic conditions and policies of the aid 
recipient economy. Among these studies Burnside and Dollar(2000) finds that aid only 
generates economic growth if the recipient government implements “good” macroeconomic 
policies. These good policies include a budget surplus, openness to trade and low inflation. 
Several studies have recently challenged these findings, showing that when the estimation 
period and dataset are altered the results change significantly (see Easterly, Levine, Roodman, 
2003 and Burnside and Dollar, 2004)). Other studies have found that conditions besides good 
macroeconomic policies are also important in allowing for the effective use and management 
of aid flows, including depth of local financial markets (Nkusu and Sayek, 2004), and external 
shocks (Guillamont Chauvet, 2001, Collier and Dehn, 2001),   
 In an attempt to explain the constraint on the economic growth of Africa, Dollar and 
Easterly (1999) find that there is no robust effect of aid on domestic investment, and no robust 
effect of domestic investment on economic growth. These findings, they suggest, imply that 
aid does not cause much growth effects in Africa. Collier and Dehn (2004) study a similar 
issue for a wider range of countries, finding that aid does spur private investment.  
 
III.  Data and Methodology 
In this study, our main hypothesis is that aid gives rise to FDI flows in countries where 
good governance and developed financial markets exist, and not necessarily otherwise.  To 
test the main hypothesis of this study, we consider that the essential feature of the estimation 
is to capture a causal effect of aid on FDI.  Since investment is irreversible, past information 
usually involves a stock of economic performance rather than year to year fluctuations due to   11
variety of reasons.  Hence, our estimation of FDI involves the moving average observations of 
the right hand side variables including the lagged moving average of FDI itself.   
In order to test the hypothesis that aid causes FDI under only favorable investment 
environment and not otherwise, we also need to control for other variables that possibly affect 
FDI.  Among them, we consider economic stability, which can be measured by the level and 
variability in inflation; level of development, which can be measured roughly by per capita 
GDP or human capital; real exchange rates, as a measure of competitiveness; openness and; 
business cycles, commonly accounted for by the growth of GDP.  In view of these, we 
propose the following model. 
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where sFDI stands for the share of FDI in GDP; all MA3 terms indicate moving averages over 
the past 3 years; sODA is the share of Overseas Development Agency records of Aid; 
lnGDPpc is the logarithm of per capita GDP in US dollars
11; D is the loss in the real value of 
money a la Cukierman et al.(1992)
12; σ5D is the variation in D over the past 5 years
13;  ln 
REER is the logarithm of real effective exchange rate; open is the measure of openness 
calculated as the share of trade in GDP; and finally, grGDP is the growth in real GDP.  The 
sources and detailed definitions of all the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
Considering that our main hypothesis involves exploring the effects of governance 
(gov) and financial market development (FMD) on the relationship between aid and FDI, we 
modify the model (1) by introducing interactive terms of both FDI and ODA with gov and 
 
11 Alternative to ln GDPpc, we also use a specification of the model where we use human capital development 
(HK), proxied by secondary school attendance.  We mention the results of the estimation of this alternative 
specification later in the paper. 
12 D = inflation rate /(1+ inflation rate) is used to reduce the variability in inflation across the data as the 
transformation restricts the measurement between 0 and 1. 
13 We considered that 5 years is a more appropriate period over which one looks at variability, even though we 
considered 3 years as sufficient for averaging other observations.    12
FMD.  Gov indices are measured with 6 different variables a la Kaufmann et al. (2003)
14, 
namely: political stability and absence of violence (polins), rule of law (rule), control of 
corruption (contcorr), government effectiveness (goveff), regulatory quality (requal), and 
voice and accountability (voacc).  We measure FMD by three different indices: the share of 
M2 in GDP (sM2); the share of deposit money banks claims in GDP (sCR); and the share in 
GDP of deposit money banks claims on private sector (sCRpr).  We form indices for all of the 
gov and FMD variables in such away that the highest number gets the value of 1 and the 
lowest is 0.  Hence, its via estimating models (2) and (3) below that we test the main 
hypotheses of this paper.   
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Models (2) and (3) employ interactions of both ODA and FDI terms with gov and FMD 
terms, respectively.  For each alternative definition of gov and FMD, we estimate the models 
separately, which results in 9 different estimations (6 for gov and 3 for FMD indicators) that 
will be reported below. 
Our panel data set covers 97 countries over the period of 1960 to 2004, where 
available.  The set of countries is simply selected based on data availability.  Furthermore, due 
to various length of time series availability for the countries, the data is unbalanced.  We note 
                                                 
14 Each of the gov variables combine numerous measures of governance and the original governance scores lie 
between -2.5 and 2.5 where higher scores in each index mean better governance.  The measures are available for 
1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  For each, we take averages over these years.   13
that the possible existence of fixed effects lead to inconsistency in OLS estimation (see, 
Nickell, 1981).  While first differencing eliminates fixed effects, this also imposes possible 
serial correlation in the error terms, assuming that the original data has no serial correlation.  
Following Arellano and Bond (1988), we employ the estimation technique that overcomes 
these problems by utilizing GMM instruments to estimate a dynamic unbalanced panel data 
(DPD).  
We thus proceed with our estimation by using the variables described above in their 
first differenced form.  The GMM instruments are chosen to be the further lags of the 
dependent variable (sFDI) than the ones included among the right hand side (RHS) variables 
and the remaining RHS variables.  The specification tests are provided under each table, 
including the tests for instrument validity (Sargan test); and that for the lack of second order 
serial correlation (m2 statistic).  We also provide Wald statistics for the joint significance of 
the various combination of variables, in addition to the overall set of RHS variables. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
The estimation of our basic model (1) is performed with GMM technique that selects 
instrumental variables for the unbalanced panel data set as the further lags of the dependent 
variables and the remainder of the control variables.  Tables 1 thru 3 reports the results of the 
estimations of models (1) to (3).   
The results of the estimation of our basic model are reported in Table 1, where we 
alternatively use GDPpc and HK as measures of the level of development, besides the rest of 
the control variables.  In column 1, we observe that ODA, lagged FDI, HK, openness and 
growth are positive and significant, as expected.  Also consistent with expectations, inflation 
(D), inflation variability and REER all exhibit negative significance, where the coefficient of 
REER indicates the effect of losing competitiveness.  As read from the bottom of the table,   14
the estimation also passes the tests of Sargan for instrument validity, and m2 for the lack of 
second order serial correlation.   
 
Table 1: Estimation of Model (1).  Dependent Variable: sFDI t 
 





















(13.60)    











































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in  
brackets are the probabilities; *** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
Virtually the same results are observed by using GDPpc instead of HL (reported in 
column 2), except that GDPpc itself appears negative and significant.   We deal with this 
unintuitive finding in the following way.  After carefully inspecting the data, we observe that   15
it is mainly the African countries that possibly derive this result.  We therefore employ a 
dummy variable for African countries (Afr) in order to differentiate the response of FDI to the 
level of income.  Indeed, when we use GDPpc along with its interaction with Afr (reported in 
Column 3), we observe that the interactive term captures the negative relationship, whereas 
GDPpc itself turns out to be positive, as expected.  This is a notably interesting result 
indicating that being a country with a relatively higher GDPpc in Africa appears to be a 
disadvantage for FDI.  
In contrast to columns 1 and 2, column 3 of the table, however, shows negative and 
significant coefficients for both ODA and lagged FDI, both of which appear as anomaly.  
Nevertheless, this anomaly is in fact not inconsistent with our main hypothesis that ODA and 
FDI lead to further FDI in the presence of favorable circumstances only, which is what we 
next turn to investigate.  The lack of robustness of the findings may indeed suggest that the 
effect of ODA on FDI may not be direct. 
Considering that the use of HK costs us about 300 data points and do not result in 
estimates much different from that reported in Column 3, we chose the specification in 
Column 3 as our basic model and thus proceed with the estimation of Models (2) and (3) 
below.  In the regressions we report in Tables 2 and 3, we investigate the additional effect of 
governance and FMD variables on the relationship between Aid and FDI. 
In Table 2, the six columns stand for the use of 6 alternative measures of the gov 
variable described before.  In all columns, while the negatively significant coefficients of both 
ODA and lagged FDI remain, our hypothesis is fully supported with the observation that both 
of their interaction with the gov variables yield positive results.  The results thus lend strong 
support for the reinforcing effect of governance on receiving FDI flows for ODA and FDI   16
receiving counties.  The remainder of the control variables is also significant in the expected 
directions across the six columns.
15   
Table 2: Estimation of Model (2); Interactions with Gov. 
Dependent Variable: sFDI t 

























































































































































































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the probabilities; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level and * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
                                                 
15 One exception is the negative coefficient of GDPpc in the first column.   17
Next, Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of Model (3) using the three 
alternative measures of FMD.  Similar to Table 2, we observe that while both ODA and 
lagged FDI exhibit negatively significant coefficients, their interaction with the FMD 
variables yield positive and significant coefficients.  This indicates that, like good governance, 
developed financial markets help to reap the positive effects of aid and FDI in the form of 
leading to further FDI flows.  The only difference from Table 2 is that σ5D loses its 
significance in all the runs reported.    
Finally, we estimate a model where we use interactions of FDI and ODA both with 
gov and FMD indicators together (not reported).  In table 4, we only report one of such cases 
(the case of rule, for the estimations the remainder of gov variables are very similar.
16   The 
estimation results reported in Table 4 (for gov =goveff) confirm that all the governance as 
well as the FMD terms contribute to the positive impact of both aid and past FDI on FDI.   In 
other words, FMD further contributes to the environment to attract the FDI flows over and 
above the effect of good governance.  While these results are generally robust for the cases of 
contcorr, goveff and requal
17, the increased potential of multicollinearity possibly accounts for 
the loss of the significance and unexpectedly significant signs of some variables. 
 
                                                 
16 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
17 For gov=contcorr and gov= polins, we observe that ODA*M2 and; for gov=contcorr, gov=rule and 
gov=goveff, and the subcase of fmd=sCRpr, GDPpc; and for gov=requal and polins, FDI*sCR are insignificant.  
In addition, FDI*m2 for the case of gov=polins; and FDI*sCR for the case of gov= voacc are negatively 
significant.  These anomalies and insignificant results results are probably due to increased multicollinearity 
among the explanatory variables.    18
Table 3: Estimation of Model (3); Interactions with FMD. 
Dependent Variable: sFDI t 







































































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios; numbers in brackets are the probabilities;  
*** indicates significance at 1% level, * indicates significance at 10% level.   19
Table 4: Estimation of Model (3); Interactions with both Gov and FMD. 
Dependent Variable: sFDI t  
 





















































































































































   20
   Several papers in the literature, Albuquerque et al (2004) among others, have also 
pointed out the possible role of the “push” factors in influencing the FDI flows.
18 To control 
for such push factors, as a separate experiment, we include global variables in order to 
account for world economic trends that could also have an effect on FDI flows.  Those control 
variables are the  world growth rate (Wgr) and the average inflation of the G5 countries 
(G5inf), where both variables are in moving averages of the past 3 years as the last of the 
variables.  To further control for the role of geographical constraints on FDI flows a dummy 
for being landlocked or not (Dlandlock) is also included in the regressions.
19 The regressions 
that include these variables yield virtually the same results as the above reported ones, while 
the coefficients of all these three variables are also significant in expected directions: while 





  Although the literature on the effects of aid and the causes and consequences of FDI is 
vast, and although it is commonsense to argue for existence of a positive relationship 
between aid and FDI is, no empirical study has yet addressed this issue satisfactorily.  
This study investigates the relationship between aid and FDI by testing the hypothesis that 
the relationship is valid only if investment environment is conducive to investment, and 
not necessarily otherwise.  Defining good investment environment as good governance 
and financial market development, we test our hypothesis in a large panel data set.  
  Using dynamic panel data specification and GMM instruments, this paper provides 
strong support for our hypothesis.  Based on the empirical evidence of this paper, it is 
                                                 
18 Calvo et al (1996) discussed the role of such push factors in influencing all capital flows, without a focus on 
FDI flows.  
19 Due to space limitations these results are not reported in a table, but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
20 See Albuquerque et al (2004) for discussions regarding the role of the world growth on FDI flows, Sayek 
(2004) for discussions regarding the role of inflation on FDI flows, and Deichmann et al (2003) for the role of 
geographical constraints on FDI decisions of MNFs.    21
possible to conclude that FDI does not necessarily flow to countries that receive aid nor 
does it do so in case a country has received FDI flows in the past.   Rather, good 
governance and developed financial markets clearly appear among the conditions that 
reinforce the positive effect of aid and former FDI flows on the maintaining the FDI 
flows.     22
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Appendix 1:   Abbreviations, Definitions and Sources of Data 
 
Name Definition 
Afr  1 =  for countries in Africa;  0 =  elsewhere. 
cGDP 
Gross domestic product in constant local currency in units.  
Source: WDI Online, NY.GDP.MKTP.KN 
Contcorr  Control of corruption index. See Govt. 
CR 
Total of deposit money banks claims in local currency in units.  
Source: IMF IFS CD-ROM 1.1.54, 22A..ZF; 22B..ZF; 22C..ZF; 22D..ZF; 
22E..MZF; 22F..ZF; 22G..ZF. 
CRpr 
Deposit Money Banks Claims on Private Sector in local currency in units.  







dlnREERt  1 ln( ) ln( ) tt REER REER − =−  
FDI 
The net change in liabilities of foreign direct investment in current US dollars in 
units.  
Source: WDI Online, BN.KLT.DINV.CD.WD 
GDP 
Gross domestic product in current local currency in units.  









Gross domestic product in current US dollars in units.  
Source: WDI Online, NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
Goveff  Governance efficiency index. See Govt. 
GovIndti 
Six governance indices provided for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  























Γ =−Ω −Ω −Ω
 
human capital 
Average years of secondary schooling. Data for a country at time t is taken to be the 
same for the subsequent years until the next available data point.  
Source: Barro and Lee (2000)   27
Name Definition 
IMF IFS  International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund 
inf 
Annual percentage of inflation in consumer prices.  
Source: WDI Online, FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG 
























lnREERt  ln( ) t REER =  
M 
Imports of goods and services in local currency in units.  
Source: WDI Online, NE.IMP.GNFS.CN 
M2 
Money and quasi money in current local currency in units.  
Source: WDI Online, FM.LBL.MQMY.CN 
µι 
1996 1998 2000 2002
4




1 =  for low income countries;  0 =  elsewhere. 
Source: The World Bank. 
ODA 
The official development assistance and official aid in current US dollars in units. 








Polins  Political stability index. See Govt. 
pop 
Population in units.  
Source: WDI Online, SP.POP.TOTL 
REER 
Real effective exchange rate index for 1995=100 in units.  
Source: IMF 
Requal  Regulatory quality index. See Govt. 
































Voacc  Voice and accountability index. See Govt. 
WDI Online  World Development Indicators Online of the World Bank 
X 
Exports of goods and services in local currency in units.  
Source: WDI Online, NE.EXP.GNFS.CN 
 